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TAXATION - STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE-PUB-
LIC LAW 86-272-FOREIGN CORPORATIONS THAT PERFORM
ACTIVITIES INCIDENTAL To SOLICITATION EXEMPTED FROM
PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATION INCOME TAX. United States To-
bacco Co. v. Commonwealth, 478 Pa. 125, 386 A.2d 471, cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 217 (1978).
In United States Tobacco Co. v. Commonwealth' the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania concluded that Public Law 86-2722 exempts
corporations engaged in interstate commerce from the Pennsylvania
corporation income tax3 if their sole activities within the state are
inextricably related to solicitation of orders for company products.4
This interpretation of the statute represents the court's initial effort5
to set definitive guidelines for foreign corporations 6 that market their
products in Pennsylvania. The position adopted by the court' per-
mits an out-of-state business to perform acts incidental to solicitation
without fear of subjection to income tax. In its rejection of a narrow
construction of "solicitation" within Public Law 86-272, section 101,8
the court declared that "such a standard for a claim of [section 101]
1. 478 Pa. 125, 386 A.2d 471, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 217 (1978).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-384 (1976). See note 8, infra.
3. Tax Reform Code of 1971, §§ 501-506, as amended PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 7501-
7506 (Purdon Supp. 1978-79). The corporation income tax has been described in terms of a
"catch-all Act intended to catch all possible taxable corporate income which was not already
taxed under the Corporate Net Income Tax Act." Commonwealth v. Eastern Motors Express,
Inc., 398 Pa. 279, 287-88, 157 A.2d 79, 84 (1959).
4. 478 Pa. at 140, 386 A.2d at 478.
5. Id at 133, 386 A.2d at 475.
6. In the context of this casenote, "foreign corporation" and similar terms refer to com-
panies not incorporated or licensed to do business in the state.
7. Justice Manderino wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices Nix,
O'Brien and Pomeroy. Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice Eagen, filed a dissenting opin-
ion. The former Chief Justice Jones did not participate in the decision.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1976).
No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to impose . a
net income tax on the income derived within such State by any person from interstate
commerce if the only business activities within such State by or on behalf of such
person during such taxable year are either, or both, of the following:
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State
for sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside the State for
approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from a
point outside the State; and
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State
in the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of such person, if orders by
such customer to such person to enable such customer to fill orders resulting from
such solicitation are orders described in paragraph (1).
Id § 381(a).
immunity would render this federal statute a complete nullity."9
United States Tobacco Company, a New Jersey corporation,
was engaged in the manufacture and sale of tobacco products. The
company sold its goods exclusively in interstate commerce, and
Pennsylvania was one state in which its products were marketed.
Other than the company-owned cars used by the sales representa-
tives and the small stock of samples they carried, the company
owned no real or personal property and did not maintain a business
office in the state.'0
Ten sales representatives were employed "'to create good will
among the retail accounts throughout the territory and . . . good
will between United States Tobacco Company and the wholesale
distributors.' "11 The salesmen informed independent wholesalers of
new products, distributed promotional materials, and occasionally
took orders, which were sent out of the state for approval or rejection
and, if approved, were filled from points outside Pennsylvania. I2 The
sales representatives visited and encouraged retailers to buy from the
independent wholesalers.' 3 In addition, the company's salesmen
gave or sold samples of new products from their small stock of
goods, exchanged stale products for fresh products and supervised
and assisted in setting up counter displays.' 4
The Commonwealth imposed a corporate income tax on the
company pursuant to Article V of the Tax Reform Code of 1971 .'
The commonwealth court was persuaded that the company's con-
9. 478 Pa. at 141, 386 A.2d at 479.
10. d at 128, 386 A.2d at 472. "For the time period in question, [United States To-
bacco] had no manufacturing plants in Pennsylvania, no warehouses or other structures in
which inventory was stored,. . . maintained no bank accounts nor kept any corporate records,
and held no corporate meetings in Pennsylvania." Id
11. Id at 143, 386 A.2d at 480.
12. Id at 128, 386 A.2d at 472. The court also found that the company "representatives
do not have the authority to accept an order, have no agency powers whatsoever, and no
authority to adjust or settle claims, collect accounts receivable, or otherwise handle any money
belonging to or due [United States Tobacco]." Id
13. Id at 143, 386 A.2d at 480. The retailers ordered directly from independent whole-
salers. The sales representatives took no orders from the retail dealers. Id at 129, 386 A.2d at
472-73.
14. Id at 128, 386 A.2d at 472.
15. Tax Reform Code of 1971, §§ 501-506, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 7501-
7506 (Purdon Supp. 1978-79). The pertinent passages provide,
§ 7501. Definitions
(4)"Sources within this Commonwealth" includes tangible or intangible prop-
erty located or having a situs in this Commonwealth and any activities carried on in
this Commonwealth, regardless of whether carried on in intrastate, interstate or for-
eign commerce.
(5)"Carrying on activities" shall include every act, power or privilege exercised
or enjoyed in this Commonwealth as an incident to, or by virtue of, the powers and
rivileges acquired by the nature of the corporate organization.
7502. Imposition of tax
Every corporation carrying on activities in this Commonwealth or ownin$ prop-
erty in this Commonwealth ... shall pay a State property tax on taxable income
derived from sources within this Commonwealth. ...
tacts with the state were sufficient to permit the taxation of the com-
pany's income earned within Pennsylvania.' 6 In the opinion of the
court, these activities went beyond the protective veil of Public Law
86-272 because the presence of salesmen "made possible the realiza-
tion and continuance of valuable contractual relations and so there is
established sufficient nexus for the imposition of the Corporation In-
come Tax. ... '7 On appeal, the supreme court confronted an area
of the law in which decisions were "not always clear. . . consistent
or reconcilable."' 8
Although courts have increased the power of the states to tax
interstate commerce,' 9 they brought this expansion in a manner that
has often obscured the rationale for this change. The confusion re-
sults because the courts fail to distinguish between two constitutional
restraints on state taxation of foreign corporations: the commerce
clause" and the due process clause.21 Originally, courts interpreted
the commerce clause to prohibit any state taxation of interstate com-
16. United States Tobacco Co. v. Commonwealth, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 211, 348 A.2d 755
(1975). This case was heard on appeal de novo from a decision of the Board of Finance and
Revenue, which had sustained the imposition of the tax.
17. Id at 219, 348 A.2d at 760 (emphasis original). The judgment of the court followed
the decision in Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington, 419 U.S. 560 (1975). The common-
wealth court also addressed two other issues: (1) whether the corporation income tax is un-
constitutional as applied to the company because of its minimal contacts; and (2) whether the
"add-back" provisions of the corporation income tax are void for want of statutory authority,
or is unconstitutional because it taxes more of the company's.income than the state can legally
reach. Since the supreme court held that Public Law 86-272 exempted the company from
taxation, the court did not consider these remaining questions. 478 Pa. at 129-30, 386 A.2d at
473.
18. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344 (1954). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has noted that:
It would be a Herculean, if not impossible task, to review and harmonize the
myriad decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on the subject of inter-
state commerce and exactly what incidents thereof may be constitutionally taxed by
the States. The dissenting opinions in many of those cases make clear that the task of
reconciling all the decisions is more difficult than was the task of Theseus as he
treaded his way through the famous Cretan Labyrinth in search of the Minotaur.
Roy Stone Transfer Corp. v. Messner, 377 Pa. 234, 243-44, 103 A.2d 700, 705 (1954).
19. See generally Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce. A Survey and an
Appraisal, 46 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1960).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The weaknesses inherent in the Articles of Confedera-
tion resulted in the erection of trade barriers between States. In an attempt to prohibit these
restraints on trade, Congress was given the power "To regulate Commerce with Foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Id See P. HARTMAN,
STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 2 (1953). See generaly FEDERALIST Nos. 7, 11,
22 (Hamilton) and 42 (Madison).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. The pertinent part of the amendment provides,
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged that the commerce and due process clauses
"are closely related and cases have tended to mix the restrictions of one clause with those of
the other." Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. State, 77 Wis. 2d 152, 159-60, 252 N.W.2d 337, 340
(1977). See Hartman, supra note 19, at 1059.
merce.22 Exceptions, however, have eroded this barrier to the impo-
sition of the corporate income tax on multistate companies.23
Recently, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,24 the Supreme
Court announced that when sufficient connection with the state ex-
ists, "a state tax on the 'privilege of doing business' is [not] per se
unconstitutional when it is applied to interstate commerce. '2 5 There-
fore, if the state tax does not unduly burden interstate commerce, the
commerce clause poses no significant restriction on the ability of the
state to tax this potential source of revenue.26
Although courts have partially removed the commerce clause
limitation on the state power to tax, the due process clause "requires
22. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887). See also Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
23. Following the decision in Robbins, supra note 22, the Supreme Court ruled that prop-
erty within a state could be taxed even though it was used in interstate commerce. "[Plersonal
property may be separated from its owner; and he may be taxed, on its account, at the place
where it is, although not the place of his domicil, and even if he is not a citizen or a resident of
the State which imposes the tax." Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 22
(1891). In the landmark case United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321
(1918), the Court permitted the imposition of a tax on a domestic corporation's net income
derived from its interstate business. Id at 329. In 1946 the Supreme Court agreed with a
California court that "a tax on net income from interstate commerce, as distinguished from a
tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, does not conflict with the commerce
clause." West Publ. Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 708, 166 P.2d 861, 863, a f'd per curiam,
328 U.S. 823 (1946).
During the same time period, the Court struck down state taxes on corporations that were
exclusively in interstate commerce. Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S.
389 (1952); Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); Freeman v. Hewit,
329 U.S. 249 (1946). In Spector the Court was insistent that the commerce clause prohibited
"state taxes upon the privilege of carrying on a business that was exclusively interstate in char-
acter. The constitutional infirmity of such a tax persists no matter how fairly it is apportioned
to business done within the state." 340 U.S. at 609 (emphasis original). The trend to remove
commerce clause limitations on the states' power to tax was continued in Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959), and later cases. Colonial Pipeline Co.
v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975); Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington, 419 U.S. 560 (1975);
General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964). See generally Hellerstein, State
Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court, 1974 Term. Standard Pressed Steel
and Colonial Pieline, 62 VA. L. REV. 149 (1976).
24. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
25. Id at 289. This decision overrules the restriction on state taxation imposed by
Spector, supra note 23. For a more complete discussion of Complete Auto Transit Inc. v.
Brady, see Comment, Recent Developments in State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 7 CAP.
U.L. REV. 143 (1977).
26. The commerce clause requires the tax to be nondiscriminatory, proportionate to ac-
tivities carried on in the state, and related to benefits provided the taxpayer. In addition, the
taxpayer has the burden of proving that the tax is unconstitutional. 430 U.S. at 278. The
Court has also expressed its concern with the possibility of "multiple taxation" of income
earned in interstate commerce. See General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 440
(1964); Michigan Fruit Canners, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 53 Mich. App. 1, 5, 218
N.W.2d 385, 387 (1974).
Although the Supreme Court has indicated that the tax must be related to benefits pro-
vided the taxpayer, the courts have
avoided the further inquiry of whether the size of the nexus is comparable with the
size of the tax. This means that for a very little protection, a state may demand an
incommensurate return, and escape judicial condemnation. The Court's justification
for this state of affairs is that judicial instruments are not fine enough to pursue the
subject further than it has. ...
W. BEAMAN, PAYING TAXES To OTHER STATES § 6-3 (1963) (emphasis original).
some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and
the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax."' 27 A slight pres-
ence in the state fails to meet due process requirements. 28 The test
that courts have used to determine whether nexus is sufficient is
based upon the benefits and protection received by the corporation.
The court inquires whether the company has received services from
the state for which it should pay its fair share of the tax burden.
29
Prior to the passage of Public Law 86-272, courts scrutinized the
company's contact with the state to find any activity substantial
enough to allow the imposition of a tax on a foreign business, 30 but
Congress stymied this enlargement of the state taxing power by ex-
empting companies that merely solicited orders within the state or
conducted third-party solicitation activities.
Congress passed Public Law 86-272 in response to strong pres-
sure from the business community 3' stirred by the United States
Supreme Court decision in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co.
v. Minnesota.32 Multistate corporations objected to this ruling in
which the Court allowed Minnesota to tax the local activities of an
out-of-state company even though the activities were a part of inter-
state commerce. 33 The contacts of the company with the state con-
sisted of a regular and systematic course of solicitation, the leasing of
a sales office and the existence of third-party solicitation. 34 The
27. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
28. In National Geographic Soc'y v. State Bd. of Equal., 16 Cal. 3d 637, 547 P.2d 458,
128 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1976); the California Supreme Court formulated the slight presence test
and announced that "the slightest presence within such taxing state independent of any con-
nection through interstate commerce will permit the state constitutionally to impose on the
seller the duty of collecting the use tax . . . and the liability for failure to do so." Id at 644,
547 P.2d at 462, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 686. The United States Supreme Court rejected the test in
National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equal., 430 U.S. 551 (1977). Although the case
involved a use tax, the standard adopted by the Court applies to all taxes that a state seeks to
impose on interstate commerce.
29. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
30. See note 23 supra. Prior to the enactment of Public Law 86-272, Pennsylvania sought
to tax the income of United States Tobacco Company that was earned within the state. At that
time, nexus with the state was also found to be insufficient. Commonwealth v. United States
Tobacco Co., 70 Dauph. 217 (Pa. C.P. 1957). In deciding this case, the court of common pleas
followed the principles that were set forth in Roy Stone Transfer Corp. v. Messner, 377 Pa.
234, 103 A.2d 700 (1954) and Commonwealth v. Eastman Kodak Co., 385 Pa. 607, 124 A.2d
100 (1956). In summarizing the law in this area the supreme court stated, "The tax must be
predicated upon the ownership of property within the taxing State, or upon local activities
which occur within the State and are not an integral or realistically inseparable part of inter-
state commerce." 377 Pa. at 243, 103 A.2d at 705.
31. S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 2-3, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS-2548, 2549. See generally Letter from H. W. Conant to Representative Edward P.
Boland (May 8, 1959), reprinted in 105 CONG. REC. 17775 (1959); Letter from J. Loring
Brooks to Representative Edward P. Boland (July 16, 1959), reprinted in 105 CONG. REc.
17775 (1959).
32. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
33. Id at 465.
34. Id at 454-55. Third-party solicitation is "the solicitation of a customer's customer by
employees of an interstate vender." W. BEAMAN, PAYING TAXES To OTHER STATES, § 6-19
(1963).
Court, however, failed to specify what activities provided a nexus
sufficient to enable the state to tax the company. The states inter-
preted the decision to expand their power to impose taxes on a cor-
poration that performed activities within the state, even though the
conduct affected interstate commerce.35
Public Law 86-272, which was enacted to clarify the Northwest-
ern States decision, provides that the solicitation of orders or third-
party solicitation creates an insufficient nexus with a state to subject
the company to state taxation imposed on, or measured by, net in-
come.3 6 The statute, however, fails to "define the critical term 'solic-
itation,'" and, "[tihe power of a state to tax foreign business
remains, therefore, a question for the courts to decide. '3 7 In forming
its interpretation of "solicitation," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
rejected the commonwealth court's broad perception of what acts
constitute a sufficient nexus, and it construed the statute to permit
foreign corporations to do more than merely ask customers for or-
ders and still avoid the unfavorable tax consequences.38
In its discussion of the legislative intent, the court stressed the
time period in which the statute was enacted.39 In both congres-
sional reports and debates congressmen expressed their belief that
this legislation would return the law to the position that it had occu-
pied prior to the Northwestern States decision,4" which supports the
view that Congress intended to exempt activities incidental to the
solicitation of orders. Nevertheless, a literal reading of Public Law
86-272 indicates that a narrow interpretation of "solicitation" is
35. Commonwealth v. Eastern Motors Express, Inc., 398 Pa. 279, 157 A.2d 79 (1959).
"As we understand the Northwestern States Portland Cement Company opinion, it greatly
expanded the prior interpretations of what are 'local activities' which are taxable by a State
even though a part of interstate commerce." Id at 295-96, 157 A.2d at 88. Shortly following
the Northwestern States decision, Idaho, Tennessee, and Utah passed tax laws to enable the
state to benefit from the Supreme Court opinion. S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 4,
reprinted in [19591 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2548, 2551.
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84 (1976).
37. Hartman, "Solicitation" and "Delivery" Under Public Law 86-272: An Uncharted
Course, 29 VAND. L. REV. 353, 362 (1976).
38. 478 Pa. at 142, 386 A.2d at 479.
39. Id. at 138, 386 A.2d at 477.
40. "In short, the policy behind the statute was maintenance of the status quo existing
prior to the court decisions of 1959." SPECIAL SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 422 (1964) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1480]. During debates on the passage
of Public Law 86-272, Representative Miller of New York observed, "All this bill does is to
restate what has always been presumed to be the law in connection with these operations in
interstate commerce." 105 CONG. REC. 17771 (1959).
In further hearings, a special committee prepared a list of activities to be treated as pro-
tected or unprotected. Protected activities include soliciting orders without authority to accept
them and displaying goods; unprotected or taxable activities consist of maintenance or owner-
ship of any business location or real property in the state, ownership of goods in a public
warehouse, frequent solicitation of orders with the authority to accept them, frequent engage-
ment in purchasing activity or performance of services, and the operation of mobile stores
within the state. H.R. REP. No. 1480, supra at 427.
plausible; the exemption should apply only if the corporation has
"no other business activities within the State."'"
Even if the legislative intent was not to immunize the type of
activities conducted by the tobacco company sales representatives,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could still find the contact insuffi-
cient to impose tax liability42 based on the congressional suggestion
that
Whether business activities other than those described in the
bill constitute a sufficient basis for the imposition by a State or
political subdivision thereof of a net income tax on income de-
rived from interstate commerce is left for future determination by
the Congress, or in the absence of congressional action, by the
courts .
43
The Supreme Court has not dealt with the issues raised in
United States Tobacco, 4 and therefore, jurisdictions remain free to
adopt their own approach toward the problem. In construing Public
Law 86-272, courts continue to dispute the effect that should be
given to the statute. A review of cases interpreting Public Law 86-
272 reveals that no majority opinion exists among the states.45 The
conflicting views are illustrated by the opinions in Gillette Co. v. State
Tax Commission46 and Clairol, Inc. v. Kingsley.47 These cases in-
volved companies that performed activities comparable to those con-
ducted by United States Tobacco, but the outcome in each case was
different. In Gillette Co. the New York court construed the statute
broadly and exempted the company from state corporate income
taxes. 48 The New Jersey court in Clairol, Inc. examined the statute
and held the company liable for the taxes because its activities went
beyond solicitation.49
In reaching its decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also
41. S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 7, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2548, 2554. See Note, Public Law 86-272. LegisadiveAmbiguities and Judicial Doicul-
ties, 27 VAND. L. REv. 313, 340 (1974).
42. Cf. Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (the state could
require contacts greater than the minimum standards set by the Supreme Court).
43. S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [19591 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 2548, 2554.
44. 478 Pa. at 133, 386 A.2d at 475.
45. Id at 134-36, 386 A.2d at 475-76. Contra, Note, supra note 41, at 340. "[T]he narrow
definition of solicitation is supported by the weight of authority among state courts that have
addressed the issue." Id.
46. 56 App. Div. 2d 475, 393 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1977).
47. 109 N.J. Super. 22, 262 A.2d 213, aftrd, 57 N.J. 199, 270 A.2d 702 (1970), appeal
dismissed 402 U.S. 902 (1971).
48. In Gillette Co. v. State Tax Commission, 56 App. Div. 2d 475, 393 N.Y.S.2d 186
(1977), the State Tax Commission argued that giving advice about display techniques went
beyond protected activities. The court refused to accept this distinction between solicitation
and marketing activities. 56 App. Div. 2d at 481, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
49. Clairol employed salesmen to promote the company's products. These sales repre-
sentatives set up displays, drove company-owned cars, carried samples, and inventoried
dealer's stock. In addition, other representatives with technical training demonstrated the use
of Clairol products. 109 N.J. Super. at 28-30, 262 A.2d at 217-18.
surveyed its prior discussions of solicitation in cases that involved
due process requirements for service of process on foreign corpora-
tions. In Shambe v. Delaware & Hudson Rail Road Co.,5  the court
announced that "'other activities' in addition to the solicitation of
business" must be present to permit the service of process on an out-
of-state business. "Such 'other activities' do not consist of acts of
courtesy performed by business solicitors, without compulsion, in or-
der to satisfy or accommodate customers."'" This impression of so-
licitation was later extended to cases involving the determination
whether a foreign company was taxable.52 Applying this principle to
the United States Tobacco situation, the court was persuaded that
the conduct of the sales representatives was "the exchanging of
friendly amenities between a solicitor and the potential customer."
5 3
Although the analogy between due process requirements for service
of process and taxation may not be appropriate in using a minimum
contacts test,54 the Shambe interpretation is applicable since it no
longer represents the nexus sufficient to allow service of process on
multistate corporations.
The impact of the United States Tobacco decision upon the
state's economy was not considered by the court, yet the conse-
quences of a broad interpretation result in the loss of valuable tax
revenues on income that is earned within the state.55 Foreign corpo-
rations will receive benefits and profits from their presence in the
state for which they will never pay. Moreover, domestic companies
are at a disadvantage in the marketplace since they must pay higher
taxes to compensate for the inability of the state to tax out-of-state
businesses,56 and since foreign corporations can sell their products at
50. 288 Pa. 240, 135 A. 755 (1927). In Shambe the court defined "doing business" for
purposes of Pennsylvania's statute pertaining to service of process upon foreign corporations.
The court held that solicitation of orders was not "doing business" under the act. Id at 248,
135 A. at 758.
51. Lutz v. Foster & Kester Co., 367 Pa. 125, 129, 79 A.2d 222, 224 (1951).
52. See Business Tax Bureau v. American Cyanamid Co., 426 Pa. 69, 231 A.2d 116
(1967); Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Philadelphia School Dist., 425 Pa. 455, 229 A.2d 881 (1967);
Motch & Merryweather Mach. Co. v. Pittsburgh School Dist., 381 Pa. 619, 116 A.2d 733
(1955).
53. 478 Pa. at 140, 386 A.2d at 478.
54. Lohr-Schmidt, Developing Jurisdictional Standards/or State Taxation of Multistate
Corporate Net Income, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1035, 1052-56 (1971). In Shambe the court recog-
nized this improper usage by its statement, "Decisions relating to taxing, licensing or to state
laws that impede the free flow of interstate commerce do not control the question of service of
process. . . . The degree of business activity must be greater in taxing and other situations." 288
Pa. at 245, 135 A. at 757 (emphasis added).
55. 478 Pa. at 142, 386 A.2d at 479-80 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
56. In a debate concerning Public Law 86-272 Representative Wright Patman addressed
the issue of the effects of the law upon local businesses.
I think this bill could be of great harm to the local independent hometown
merchants. Like it is now, the hometown merchants are paying all the taxes to help
sustain the local communities, and under the Supreme Court decisions hereafter the
people who are doing an interstate business, and from the outside who come into the
territory of this local merchant and take part of his business and part of his profits
lower prices than the domestic companies. Consequently, the adop-
tion of a broad interpretation places extra burdens upon the state
and domestic corporations.
The instructions set forth by the court concerning the activities
that are exempt under Public Law 86-272 will aid lower courts and
interstate companies in assessing the tax consequence of a company's
nexus with the state. 7 "[I]nforming customers of new products, tak-
ing orders, and assisting in the display of those products" will not
result in state taxation. 8 Furthermore, the mode of travel used by
the sales representatives is insufficient contact with the state to allow
the imposition of an income tax.59
The court's failure to specify what conduct constitutes sufficient
nexus with the state permits the continued taxation of activities that
have been adjudged sufficient contacts with the state. Thus, the deci-
sions of the commonwealth court in CL Whitten Transfer Co. v.
Commonwealth60 and Commonwealth v. Universal Carloading and
Distributing Co. 6 1 continue to control the imposition of corporate in-
come taxes on interstate companies. In Whitten Transfer the court
held that although the company did not engage in solicitation, the
intrastate delivery of goods was sufficient contact with the Common-
wealth to allow the taxing of the company.62 In Universal Carloading
the court found sufficient nexus to permit the imposition of the in-
come tax when, in addition to its solicitation activities, the company
leased four freight terminals, collected money, and handled freight.63
Furthermore, decisions in other jurisdictions that the giving of tech-
and make money on it will also have to pay a fair share of those profits to the local
taxing authority. In other words, the hometown merchant will have the burden taken
off of him to that extent. But, if this bill passes, the hometown merchant will have to
continue to pay all the burden and the outside concern that rushes in and gets busi-
ness away from the local merchant will pay no tax whatsoever on the profit of such
business; just leave it to the hometown merchant to carry all the burdens.
at 105 CONG. REC. 17769 (remarks of Rep. Patman) (1959).
57. For a conflicting viewpoint see Note, supra note 41, at 340 (1974), in which the au-
thor suggests that a narrow construction of the statute would give the courts more efficient
standards with which to work.
58. 478 Pa. at 142, 386 A.2d at 479.
59. Id at 140, 386 A.2d at 478-79.
60. 34 Pa. Commw. Ct. 37, 382 A.2d 1251 (1978).
61. 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 553, 372 A.2d 41 (1977).
62. 34 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 40-43, 382 A.2d at 1252-53. In Whitten Transfer the court
decided that the state could impose the corporate net income tax on the company because the
Pennsylvania Corporation Net Income Tax Law provides for the imposition of a tax for the
privilege of doing business in the state. Tax Reform Code of 1971, §§ 401-412, as amended,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 7401-7412 (Purdon Supp. 1978-79).
63. 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 554-57, 372 A.2d at 41-42. In Universal Carloading the court
scrutinized the state franchise tax, which is a tax on the value of all capital stock of companies
doing business within the state. Tax Reform Code of 1971, §§ 601-606, as amended, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 72, §§ 7601-7606 (Purdon Supp. 1978-79).
nical advice,64 collection of an initial deposit,65 consignment of prod-
ucts66  and provision of extensive services by an out-of-state
franchisor67 fall beyond the scope of solicitation may provide guide-
lines for Pennsylvania courts.
The court in United States Tobacco Co. v. Commonwealth clari-
fied the interpretation of "solicitation" within the meaning of Public
Law 86-272 and provided a framework for determining interstate ac-
tivities that may be subject to the Pennsylvania corporate net income
tax. Although the broad construction given to the statutory exemp-
tion will result in lost income tax revenues, the non-taxed status of
activities incidental to solicitation will enhance the free flow of inter-
state commerce and may stimulate other taxable activities.68
64. Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington, 419 U.S. 560 (1975) (engineer primarily
consulted with customer); General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964) (con-
ducted service clinics to teach efficient service techniques); Iron Fireman Mfg. Co. v. State Tax
Commission, 251 Or. 227, 445 P.2d 126 (1968) (gave technical advice to customer in state).
65. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc. v. Porterfield, 15 Ohio St. 2d 54, 238 N.E.2d 554 (1968) (sales
and collection activities); Herff Jones Co. v. State Tax Commission, 247 Or. 404, 430 P.2d 998
(1967) (collection of an initial deposit from customers); Cal-Roof Wholesale, Inc. v. State Tax
Commission, 242 Or. 435, 410 P.2d 233 (1966) (spot credit and collection of delinquent ac-
counts).
66. Hervey v. AMF Beaird, Inc., 250 Ark. 147, 464 S.W.2d 557 (1971) (arrangement be-
tween buyer and seller was a consignment not a sale of tangible personal property). See also
Olympia Brewing Co. v. Department of Revenue, 266 Or. 309, 511 P.2d 837 (1973), cert. de-
nied, 415 U.S. 976 (1974) (beer kegs in the state).
67. Virginia Foods of Bluefield, Va., Inc. v. Dailey, - W. Va.-, 239 S.E.2d 770 (1977)
(company performed counseling services as part of duties).
68. If sales of products within the state increase because of the solicitation activities of
interstate companies, the state will collect additional revenues from the state sales tax. In
addition, if higher sales will increase the profits of local merchants, the state can assess higher
corporate income taxes on these profits.
[Casenote by David L. Schwalm]
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PROOF OF COMPENSABLE IN-
JURY---CLAIMANTS NEED ONLY PROVE THAT HEART ATTACK
OCCURRED IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT AND RELATED
THERETO. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Bernard S.
Pincus Company, 479 Pa. 286, 388 A.2d 659 (1978).
In Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Bernard S Pincus
Company, ' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that fatal heart
attacks2 suffered by two employes performing their usual job assign-
ments were injuries related to their employment and thus compensa-
ble under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act.3 By
holding that these heart attacks were compensable the court elimi-
nated a claimant's burden of proving that his injury resulted from
violence to the physical structure of his body or that his pre-existing
heart condition was aggravated to the point of failure by unusual
exertion. Rather, a claimant now will be compensated if a work-
man's compensation referee determines that the attack occurred in
the course of decedent's employment and was related thereto.
The Pincus case represents the consolidation of two appeals
taken from the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania by the Ber-
nard S. Pincus Company4 and Ayres Philadelphia, Inc.' In both
cases, which involved nearly identical factual and procedural histo-
ries,6 a workmen's compensation referee determined that the dece-
dent who had a history of heart trouble suffered a fatal heart attack
1. 479 Pa. 286, 388 A.2d 659 (1978).
2. The term "heart attack" in this note is used generically to include all attacks, failures,
and damages resulting from specific causes such as myocardial infarction, coronary occlusion,
arteriosclerosis, angina pectoris and fibrillation.
3. Act of June 2,1915, P.L. 736, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77 §§ I et seq. (Purdon
Supp. 1978-1979).
4. 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. 655, 357 A.2d 707 (1976).
5. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Ayres Philadelphia 23 Pa. Commw. Ct.
249, 351 A.2d 306 (1976).
6. Decedent Vincent Squillacioti was employed by the Bernard S. Pincus Company as a
truck driver. His duties included lifting and carrying meat products from the inside of his
employer's truck to the tailboard of the truck where the employes of his employer's consignees
would remove the products. Decedent died suddenly of a heart attack on June 13, 1973, one-
half hour after he had unloaded some 6000 pounds of meat from his truck.
Decedent Raymond Lenz was employed by Ayers Philadelphia, Inc. as a material cutter
and spreader, which called for him to spread material tautly on a large cutting table and cut it
by guiding a special knife over it. On September 14, 1972, while performing this duty, dece-
dent died suddenly of a heart attack.
In both cases the referee awarded benefits to the decedent's widow, which awards were
affirmed by the Appeal Board and the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Workmen's
Comp. App. Bd. v. Bernard S. Pincus Co., 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. 655, 357 A.2d 707 (1976);
while engaged in his normal employment activities. The common-
wealth court's affirmation of the referees' awards of benefits to dece-
dents' claimants is significant because the court applied the new
standard of compensability promulgated by the 1972 amendments to
the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act.7 The new provi-
sions of the law ameliorate to some degree the difficulties tradition-
ally encountered in claims for compensation for heart attacks in
Pennsylvania.8 Although heart attacks were recognized as compen-
sable injuries in Pennsylvania before the 1972 amendments, 9 com-
pensation was founded only upon accident; t0 if a disabled employe
could not show that his injury was caused by an accident, he did not
sustain a compensable injury under Pennsylvania law."
The pre-1972 accident requirement provoked much criticism
12
for two reasons. First, the legislature failed to define the term "acci-
dent." Thus, the task of defining the term was given to the courts,
Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. v. Ayers Philadelphia, Inc., 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 249, 351 A.2d 306
(1976).
7. Act of March 29,1972, P.L. 159, No. 61, amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ I etseq.
(1952). Pertinent parts of the amendment read as follows: "Every employer shall be liable for
compensation for personal injury to, or for the death of each employe, by an injury in the
course of his employment, and such compensation shall be paid in all cases by the em-
ployer .. " PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431 (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979).
The terms "injury" and "personal injury," as used in this act, shall be construed
to mean an injury to an employe, regardless of his previous physical condition, aris-
ing in the course of his employment and related thereto, and such disease or infection
as naturally results from the injury or is aggravated, reactivated or accelerated by the
injury; and wherever death is mentioned as a cause for compensation under this act,
it shall mean only death resulting from such injury and its resultant effects. . . .The
term "injury arising in the course of his employment," as used in this article ...
shall include all other injuries sustained while the employe is actually engaged in the
furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer, whether upon the employer's
premises or elsewhere ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411(1) (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979).
The 1972 amendments apply only to injuries suffered after May 1, 1972. See Elko v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 33 Pa. Commw. Ct. 105, 107, 380 A.2d 1318, 1319
(1977); Korn v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 507, 509, 371 A.2d
574, 575 (1977). The injuries that form the basis of the present action occurred after May 1,
1972, and thus the 1972 amendments apply to these actions. See note 6 supra.
8. "The compensability of heart attacks continues to be probably the most prolific and
troublesome problem in workmen's compensation law." Larson, The "Heart Cases" in Work-
men's Compensation: An Analysis and Suggested Solution, 65 MICH. L. REV. 441 (1967).
9. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Procon, Inc., 434 Pa. 90, 252 A.2d 601 (1969); Landis v. Work-
men's Compensation Appeal Bd., 35 Pa. Commw. Ct. 122, 383 A.2d 246 (1978); Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd. v. United Sheet Metal Co., 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 535, 336 A.2d 896
(1975); B.G. Coon Constr. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 15 Pa. Commw. Ct.
484, 326 A.2d 656 (1974).
10. Prior to its amendment in 1972, the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act pro-
vided, "When employer and employe shall by agreement... accept the provisions of article
three of this act, compensation for personal injury to, or for the death of such employe, by an
accident, in the course of his employment, shall be paid in all cases by the employer .. "
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431 (Purdon 1952), as amended, (Purdon Supp. 1976) (emphasis ad-
ded). Compare these provisions with those presented in note 7 supra.
11. See, e.g., Hilt v. Roslyn Volunteer Fire Co., 445 Pa. 133, 281 A.2d 873 (1971); Ander-
son v. King Kup Candies, Inc., 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 227, 281 A.2d 369 (1971).
12. See, Comment, Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation. An Analysis of Persistent
Problems and Recent Legislative Reform, 76 DICK. L. REV. 445, 456 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation].
which responded with several different definitions 3 and thereby
made the application of the law extremely unpredictable.' 4 Second,
because application of the accident requirement was difficult, courts
evolved exceptions that were used when an accident could not be
unequivocally demonstrated according to existing judicial defini-
tions. Nevertheless, the employe was compensated in these situa-
tions because the incident was clearly related to employment and the
grant of benefits was consistent with the humanitarian purposes of
workmen's compensation legislation.' 5
The two major exceptions arising from the accident requirement
were the unusual strain or exertion doctrine' 6 and the unusual path-
ological result doctrine.' 7 When applied, these doctrines produced a
"tangled web of recovery" with courts granting compensation based
on their compassion and sympathetic interpretation of the purposes
behind workmen's compensation legislation.'" Instead of judicially
eliminating the accident requirement,' 9 the courts made inroads and
exceptions that permitted recovery in individual cases, but that made
the application of the accident requirement more unpredictable in
future cases.20 Finally, in Hamilton v. Procon, Inc.,2' the supreme
13. See, e.g., Hinkle v. H.J. Heinz Co., 462 Pa. 111, 116, 337 A.2d 907, 910 (1975) ("unto-
ward event, not expected or designed, occurring, not from the usual course of events"); Lacey
v. Washburn & Williams Co., 309 Pa. 574, 577, 164 A. 724, 725 (1933) (accident must be
interpreted in its usual, ordinary, and popular sense as defined by Webster); Panther Valley
School Dist. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 178, 183, 318 A.2d
403, 406 (1974) ("any unforeseen, untoward happening which was not to be reasonably antici-
pated"); Hinkle v. H.J. Heinz Co., 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. 216, 222-23, 298 A.2d 632, 635-36 (1972),
vacated, 462 Pa. 111, 337 A.2d 907 (1975) (delineation of four common elements present in
virtually every accident and four basic categories of accidents).
14. "It was apparent that despite the craftiest judicial construction, the word 'accident'
could not be made to work as the differential factor between most compensable and non-
compensable injuries. ... Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation, supra note 12, at 449.
See Hamilton v. Procon, Inc., 211 Pa. Super. Ct. 446, 460, 236 A.2d 819, 826 (1967), rev'd, 434
Pa. 90, 252 A.2d 601 (1969).
15. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has characterized the Workmen's Compensation
Law as "a remedial Act passed for the benefit of workers, authorized by the police powers of
the State and. . . frequently referred to as a humanitarian measure." Dupree v. Barney, 193
Pa. Super. Ct. 331, 336, 163 A.2d 901, 904 (1960).
16. The unusual strain doctrine forces a claimant to demonstrate that his injury resulted
from an unusual strain or exertion occurring in the course of his employment. The doctrine is
to be applied according to the work history of the individual involved and not according to the
work patterns of his profession in general. Hamilton v. Procon, Inc., 211 Pa. Super. Ct. 446,
236 A.2d 819, 822 (1967), rev'd, 434 Pa. 90, 252 A.2d 601 (1969). This doctrine is still applica-
ble to injuries occurring before the effective date of the 1972 amendments. See, e.g., Landis v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 35 Pa. Commw. Ct. 122, 383 A.2d 246 (1978); City of
Johnstown v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 33 Pa. Commw. Ct. 464, 381 A.2d 1355
(1978).
17. The unusual pathological result doctrine focuses on the results of the employe's activ-
ities and supplies an accident by finding that the employe tore tissue or broke bones while
performing his usual work in the usual fashion. Thus, the accident is held to reside in the
extraordinary effect rather than in the cause where it was held to reside under the unusual
strain doctrine. See, Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation, supra note 12, at 446.
18. Id at 457.
19. See notes 10 and 11 and accompanying text suprat
20. See, Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation, supra note 12, at 458 and examples cited
therein. For a further demonstration of the unpredictable results achieved by the use of the
court decided that the unusual strain doctrine was no longer respon-
sive to the problems presented in workmen's compensation proceed-
ings. Although it chose not to abrogate the doctrine judicially, the
court stated that the legislature should assume that responsibility af-
ter carefully investigating the consequences.22
In 1972 the Pennsylvania legislature responded to this judicial
plea for reform by amending the workmen's compensation law. The
most significant change in the law was the substitution of the concept
"injury" for the requirement of an "accident."23 The basis for com-
pensability under the 1972 amendments thus became an "injury aris-
ing out of the course of employment and related thereto. ' 24 Since
the injuries suffered by the decedents in the instant case occurred
after May 1, 1972, the effective date of the amendments, the Pincus
court applied this new standard of compensability. 25 The court's
holding followed a brief line of Pennsylvania cases that awarded
compensation in similar heart attack situations.26
Application of the new amendments proved difficult, however,
for neither they nor past judicial applications of the new amend-
ments provided a definition for the term "injury. '27 Indeed, one
court had specifically refused to delineate an ecumenical definition.28
The Pincus court responded to this void by accepting the nontechni-
cal definition advanced by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Crei-
ghan v. Fireman's Relief and Pension Fund Board29 The Creighan
accident requirement compare B.G. Coon Constr. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Bd., 15 Pa. Commw. Ct. 484, 326 A.2d 656 (1974) (compensation granted to claimant whose
decedent suffered a fatal heart attack as a result of unusual exertion required by driving a
vehicle different from that to which he was accustomed) with Szcykalski v. Workmen's Com-
pensation Appeal Bd., 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 159, 348 A.2d 442 (1975) (compensation denied to
claimant whose decedent suffered a fatal heart attack that was claimed to have resulted from
unusual strain involved in driving and loading a truck different from that to which he was
accustomed).
21. 434 Pa. 90, 252 A.2d 601 (1969).
22. Id at 97, 252 A.2d at 604.
23. See notes 7 and 10 supra.
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 411, 431 (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979).
25. See note 7 supra.
26. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Bowen, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 593, 364 A.2d
1387 (1976); Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Kanell Jewelers, Inc., 22 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1, 347 A.2d 500 (1975); Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Auto Express, Inc., 21 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 559, 346 A.2d 829 (1975); Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Jeddo High-
land Coal Co., 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. 90, 338 A.2d 744 (1975).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411(1) (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979) only provides that,
The terms "injury and "personal injury," as used in this act, shall be construed
to mean an injury to an employe, regardless of his previous physical condition, aris-
ing in the course of his employment and related thereto, and such disease or infection
as naturally results from the injury or is aggravated, reactivated or accelerated by the
injury ...
28. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Bernard S. Pincus Co., 24 Pa. Commw. Ct.
655, 656, 357 A.2d 707, 708 (1976).
29. 397 Pa. 419, 155 A.2d 844 (1959). The court in Creighan entertained the question
whether claimant's. tuberculosis was an "injury" within the meaning of the Fireman's Relief
and Pension Fund Law. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 53, §§ 23601 e. seq. (Purdon 1977-1978).
court adopted the definition of injury found in Webster's Interna-
tional Dictionary, noting that "nowhere in the definition is violence
a preliminary sine qua non to injury."30 Prior to the 1972 amend-
ments the. Act defined injury to require "violence to the physical
structure of the body."'" The adoption of the Creighan dictionary
definition, however, caused the Pincus court to determine that the
"[d]ecedents' heart attacks caused physical damage to the internal tis-
sues of the heart. Such damage to a bodily organ is no less an injury
than a broken leg or a cut arm,32 and as such was intended by the
legislature to be compensable if related to the decedent's employ-
ment.
33
The damage standard advanced by the Pincus court helps to
overcome another problem traditionally encountered in workmen's
compensation cases when the claimed injury is heart related;
namely, whether a heart attack resulting from a disease or condition
that develops over a long period of time and of which the victim is
unaware is compensable as an injury.34 The court's holding specifi-
cally includes diseases within the concept of the injury35 and indi-
cates to referees, appeal boards and courts hearing future cases that a
heart attack is to be considered an injury whether it results from a
single trauma or a slowly evolving condition.
The remaining hurdle confronting the Pincus court was whether
decedents' injuries occurred during "the course of employment" and
were "related thereto." Adopting its proper role as an appellate
court in a workmen's compensation proceeding,36 the court did not
30. Id at -, 155 A.2d at 846.
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (1952), as amended, (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979).
32. For examples of other types of mishaps that were held to be injuries under the 1972
amendments, see City of Hazleton v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 35 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 477, 386 A.2d 1067 (1978) (heart and lung disease caused by stress and exposure to smoke,
gas, and fumes during firefighters duties held to be compensable); Royesky v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd., 34 Pa. Commw. Ct. 274, 383 A.2d 566 (1978) (intracerebral hemor-
rhage ruled injury but held not compensable); Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v.
United States Steel Corp., 31 Pa. Commw. Ct. 329, 376 A.2d 271 (1977) (epileptic seizure
causing fatal automobile accident ruled compensable); Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 454, 352 A.2d 571 (1976) (inguinal hernia suf-
fered at some unspecified time during employe's operation of machine held compensable);
North American Rockwell Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Chamberlain
Mfg. Corp., 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 572, 336 A.2d 659 (1975) (hernia that was surgically irrepara-
ble due to cirrhosis condition ruled compensable).
33. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Bernard S. Pincus Co., 479 Pa. 286, 287,
388 A.2d 659, 664 (1978) (emphasis added).
34. Indeed, the appellant employers argued here that "diseases" could not have been
intended to be included within the term "injury." They pointed to other sections of the Act
dealing with time limitations on notice, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 631-633 (Purdon Supp.
1978-1979) and the statute of limitations, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 77, § 602 (Purdon Supp. 1978-
1979), that specify periods of time that begin to run from the date of the "injury" as evidence
that the legislature intended to continue the prior law's established concept that injury is an
event. 479 Pa. 286, 295-96, 388 A.2d at 659, 663.
35. Id
36. See note 39 anfra
inquire whether decedents actually suffered their heart attacks dur-
ing the course of their employment.37 Instead, the court held that the
referees' findings on this question were supported by substantial evi-
dence 8 and that the claimants had carried their burden of proof.
3 9
This holding hinders any insight into the rationale employed by the
referees who found that decedents' injuries occurred within the
course of employment as defined by the Act.40
Although the 1972 amendments have produced substantial
changes in the Workmen's Compensation Act, the definition of
"course of employment" remains the same. Prior judicial interpreta-
tions of the phrase therefore remain operative because there has
never been any significant change in the type of injuries that are con-
sidered to have occurred while in the course of employment.4 Prob-
ably the most enlightening discussion of the course of employment
requirement was offered in North American Rockwell Corporation v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board,4 2 in which the court held
37. The referee is the finder of fact in a workmen's compensation case. His function is to
determine the weight and credibility of the evidence presented. The court, without taking any
further evidence, may not reverse a referee's decision on the credibility of evidence merely
because it may have evaluated that evidence otherwise. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Bd. v. International Furnace Corp., 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 390, 393, 345 A.2d 780, 782 (1975).
38. In a workmen's compensation case, evidence is substantial when a reasonable person,
acting reasonably, might reach the same conclusion as that reached by the fact finding author-
ity. Harrisburg Housing Auth. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 14 Pa. Commw. Ct.
413, 415, 322 A.2d 753, 754 (1974). Accord, Tritex Sportswear, Inc. v. Commonwealth Unem-
ployment Comp. Bd., 12 Pa. Commw. Ct. 335, 337, 315 A.2d 322, 324 (1974).
39. 479 Pa. at 297-98, 388 A.2d at 664. The proper standard of review to be exercised by
an appellate court in a workmen's compensation case depends on which party prevailed in the
administrative proceeding before the referee and the appeal board.
If the party who has the burden of proof prevailed in the administrative process,
review by this Court is to determine whether constitutional rights were violated, an
error of law committed or to make certain that necessary findings of fact are sup-
ported by substantial evidence, . . . but if the decision is against the party carrying
the burden of proof, our review is limited to a determination of whether the findings
of fact are consistent with each other and with the conclusions of law and can be
sustained without a capricious disregard of competent evidence.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Young, 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 515, 517-18, 336 A.2d
665, 666 (1975).
The claimant has the burden of proving a compensable injury. Workmen's Compensa-
tion Appeal Bd. v. Jeddo Highland Coal Co., 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. 90, 94 n.9, 338 A.2d 744, 747
n.5 (1975). The claimant prevailed in the administrative process in the instant case, see note 6
supra, and, therefore the proper standard of review applied by the Pincus court was the one
based on constitutional rights, error of law, and substantial evidence.
40. The term "injury arising in the course of employment" as used in this article.
shall include all other injuries sustained while the employe is actually engaged in the
furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer, whether upon the employer's
premises or elsewhere, and shall include all injuries caused by the condition of the
premises or by the operation of the employer's business or affairs thereon, sustained
by the employe, who, though not so engaged, is injured upon the premises occupied
by or under the control of the employer, or upon which the employer's business or
affairs are being carried on, the employe's presence thereon being required by the
nature of his employment.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979).
41. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Borough of Plum, 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 35,
39, 340 A.2d 637, 639-40 (1975).
42. 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 437, 346 A.2d 379 (1975).
that a decedent's injuries suffered when he was struck by a passing
automobile on a public road adjacent to his employer's plant did not
arise in the course of his employment. The Rockwell court, para-
phrasing the language of the statute, recognized two categories of
injuries that arise in the course of employment: first, those sus-
tained while the employe is actually engaged in the furtherance of
his employer's business or affairs, whether sustained on or off his
employer's premises, and, second, those sustained by an employe on
his employer's premises, provided that his injuries are caused by the
condition of the premises or by the operation of the employer's busi-
ness or affairs and the employe's presence is required thereon by the
nature of his employment.43 Although the Pincus court was not per-
mitted to review the referees' determinations that the decedents'
heart attacks occurred within the course of their employment, had
the referees ruled to the contrary, the court clearly would have been
able to reverse their findings as unsupported by substantial evi-
dence' since both of the heart attacks satisfied the Rockwell stan-
dard.45
The final and most important46 requirement for compensability
under the 1972 amendments is that a decedent's injury be related to
his employment. Pre-1972 law contained no explicit "related
thereto" provision.47 The doctrines of unusual strain and unusual
pathological result,48 as they developed under the previous accident
requirement, were, however, logically founded on the premise that a
claimant be required to demonstrate that his injury was causally re-
lated to his employment. The finding of an unusual strain or unu-
sual pathological result was necessary to establish that a claimant's
heart attack resulted in some way from his employment and not sim-
ply from the natural progression of his pre-existing heart condition
or disease.49 The significance of the Pincus decision is that it dis-
43. Id at 440-41, 346 A.2d at 381-82.
44. See note 38 supra.
45. At first glance decedent Squillacioti's death might seem to be beyond his course of
employment because at the time of his fatal heart attack he was returning to his truck after his
lunch period and had not yet recommenced work. But see Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Bd. v. Borough of Plum, 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 35, 340 A.2d 637 (1975), in which the court held
that victim of a shooting who was hauling asphalt to a jobsite was engaged in his employer's
business and that his minor deviation for personal comfort or leisure did not break the chain of
conduct constituting course of employment. Accord, Mitchell v. Holland Furnace Co., 189 Pa.
Super. Ct. 82, 149 A.2d 662 (1959); Hess v. Catholic Knights of St. George, 149 Pa. Super. Ct.
575, 27 A.2d 542 (1942).
46. - A reading of a substantial number of workmen's compensation case decisions readily
demonstrates that courts actually spend much less time and consideration on the issues of
"injury" and "course of employment" than they spend on the issue of "related to employ-
ment." The first two issues are usually decided rather summarily while the "related to" issue
frequently involves the main analysis of the case.
47. See note 10 supra.
48. See notes 16 and 17 supra
49. See A.P. Green Refractories Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 8 Pa.
pensed with the requirement of proving an unusual strain or exertion
in cases in which a claimant has a documented, pre-existing condi-
tion.50 The court held that the legislature intended to eliminate the
requirements of the unusual strain doctrine when it amended the
Workmen's Compensation Act to remove the accident requirement.
Today, physically sound persons, as well as those affected by pre-
existing heart disease, need only prove that they suffered an injury in
the course of their employment and related thereto.5 Although the
Pincus court's holding has been recognized by other cases,5 2 many
Pennsylvania courts have objected to granting compensation for ac-
cidents or injuries that are attributable to the pre-existing conditions
of the claimant.53
In determining whether decedents' claimants satisfied the causa-
tion requirement, the court necessarily limited its inquiry to whether
the referees' findings of fact, atrmed by the appeal board, were sup-
ported by substantial evidence.54 The court found that the record
substantiated the referees' findings that the claimant in each case had
shown that the decedent's heart attack was related to his employ-
Commw. Ct. 172, 301 A.2d 914 (1973); Scannella v. Salerno Importing Co., 2 Pa. Commw. Ct.
11, 275 A.2d 907 (1971).
50. The court noted that since both decedents had pre-existing heart conditions, the ap-
plication of the unusual strain doctrine would have been necessary under the prior law. Given
the nature of their work assignments, application of this doctrine might have denied recovery
to both claimants because in neither case was evidence presented that decedents engaged in
unusually strenuous activity at the time of the heart attack. 479 Pa. at 293, 388 A.2d at 662.
51. A claimant need not even pinpoint a specific event that precipitated his injury. An
injury that develops over the course of time and from a number of work activities in which the
employe engages is compensable as long as the conditions of "course of employment" and
"related thereto" are satisfied. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 454, 352 A.2d 571 (1976).
52. See Stump v. Folmer Trucking Co., 448 Pa. 313, 292 A.2d 294 (1972) (truck driver's
fatal heart attack that resulted from emotional excitement after a minor accident held compen-
sable although evidence of a previous heart condition was presented); Workmen's Compensa-
tion Appeal Bd. v. Universal Cyclops Specialty Steel Div. of Cyclops Corp., 20 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 261, 341 A.2d 223 (1975) (claimant's injury resulting from surgery held compensable even
though his injury was in part attributable to a previous accident for which he had also received
compensation). See also Hamilton v. Procon, Inc., 434 Pa. 90, 252 A.2d 601 (1969); Mohler v.
Cook, 205 Pa. Super. Ct. 232, 209 A.2d 7 (1965).
53. See Pirillo v. Barber Asphalt Co., 140 Pa. Super. Ct. 334, 13 A.2d 906 (1940):
The compensation laws were enacted for the benefit of the employee but the liability
of the employer ends with the obligation to pay compensation for accidental injury.
To hold an employer responsible for disability resulting from the fact that an em-
ployee is not physically fit, is the equivalent of saying that an employer may hire a
laborer only at his own risk. In effect a rule which imposes liability upon an em-
ployer for disability or death in such circumstances would make the employer an
insurer of the fitness of the applicant. . . .The employer is not an insurer. . . and
the operation of a rule, so far-reaching, would inevitably result in unemployment, in
;reater numbers, of men of advanced age, a result not intended by our compensation
las.
Id at 338, 13 A.2d at 908. See also Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. United States
Steel Corp., 31 Pa. Commw. Ct. 329, 340, 376 A.2d 271, 276 (1977) (Blatt, J., dissenting) (com-
pensation awarded to widow of employe whose death was caused by injuries suffered when, as
a result of an epileptic seizure, he lost control of his automobile in the company parking lot).
54. 479 Pa. at 297-98, 388 A.2d at 664. See also notes 38 and 39 smpra.
ment."s These findings were predicated on expert medical testimony
produced by the claimants. This testimony indicated that in the case
of decedent Squillacioti the heart attack resulted from the work in
which he was engaged on behalf of his employer, 6 and in the case of
decedent Lenz the heart attack that caused his death was precpitated
by his work.57 In each case the appellant employer introduced ex-
pert medical testimony to rebut these assertions. Since it is the func-
tion of the referee and not of the appellate courts to determine the
credibility of and weight58 to be given to the testimony of medical
experts,59 the resolution of this contradiction is properly left to the
referee as the finder of fact.6"
Justice Pomeroy, concurring and dissenting, analyzed the causa-
tion requirement more vigorously. While he concurred with the ma-
jority's finding that decedent Squillacioti's heart attack was related
to his employment, he dissented from the majority's similar holding
with regard to decedent Lenz. Instead, Justice Pomeroy subjected
the opinion testimony of Lenz's medical expert 6' to closer scrutiny
and concluded that the evidence was not sufficient to establish the
necessary causal connection, 62 and thus that compensation was im-
properly allowed.
63
55. 479 Pa. at 298, 388 A.2d at 664.
56. Id at 289, 388 A.2d at 660 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 290, 388 A.2d at 660 (emphasis added).
58. The qualifications of testifying physicians may affect the relative weight to be given
to their testimony, but it does not render claimant's physician incompetent as a matter of law
to testify as to the existence of disease and to medical causation. City of Hazleton v. Work-
men's Compensation Appeal Bd., 35 Pa. Commw. Ct. 477, 386 A.2d 1067, 1071 (1978). See
also Calcite Quarry Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 347,
322 A.2d 403 (1974) (weight of testimony held insufficient to support finding of causation
because claimant's witness was an orthopedic surgeon qualified to express opinion as to back
injury, but whose qualifications to express opinions concerning heart conditions was repeat-
edly and emphatically challenged).
59. Aluminum Co. of America v. Theis, 11 Pa. Commw. Ct. 587, 591, 314 A.2d 893, 896
(1974).
60. Furthermore, a referee is not required to state his reasons for accepting one medical
opinion over another but may simply state that he was "inclined" to believe the version given
by one party's physician rather than the one given by the other party's doctor. City of Hazle-
ton v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 35 Pa. Commw. Ct. 477, 386 A.2d 1067, 1070
(1978).
61. A partial text of the claimant's medical expert's testimony is reprinted at 479 Pa. at
299 n.2, 388 A.2d at 665 n.2.
62. For other examples of post-1972 amendment cases when courts have held as a matter
of law that claimant's expert medical testimony was insufficient to establish the causal connec-
tion between his employment and injuries see Royesky v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Bd., 34 Pa. Commw. Ct. 274, 383 A.2d 566 (1978) unequivocal medical testimony overcome by
directly contrary testimony); Rosenberry Bros. Lumber Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Ap-
peal Bd., 36 Pa. Commw. Ct. 283, 387 A.2d 526 (1978) (medical testimony was far from une-
quivocal); Hudack v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 32 Pa. Commw. Ct. 508, 379
A.2d 1074 (1977) (ambiguous and uncertain medical testimony did not address the question of
causation; Giant Markets, Inc. v. Morgan, 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. 439, 368 A.2d 885 (1977) (com-
plete lack of supporting medical testimony).
63. 479 Pa. at 299, 388 A.2d at 665. Claimant Lenz's medical witness was only able to
testify that the precipitating cause of death was probably the environment of his work, but only
in that the decedent happened to be at work when he died. Id. While he stated that stress
Justice Pomeroy's opinion is in accord with several Penn-
sylvania courts that have held that when there is no obvious causal
relationship6" between the injuries suffered by the claimant and his
employment, the relationship must be established by unequivocal
medical testimony.65 For example, in Columbus Service International
and Underwriters Adjusting Company v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Board66 a case in which a claimant suffered back injuries in
the course of her employment, the commonwealth court indicated
that a medical witness must testify that, in his opinion, the injury did
come from the assigned cause and that a less direct expression of
opinion does not constitute legally competent evidence.67 In Dunlap
v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board,68 again involving a back
injury, the commonwealth court further defined this standard by in-
dicating that "the medical witness must testify, not that the injury or
condition might have, or even possibly did, come from the assigned
cause, but that in his professional opinion the result in question did
come from the assigned cause."69
When the injury suffered is a heart attack, however, courts have
held that medical testimony concerning causation need not be given
with unqualified certainty,7" and have indicated that the mere ab-
sence of the magic words "his work caused his heart attack" should
not preclude his recovery of benefits when the referee who heard the
testimony determined that the requisite causation was present.7 ' For
example, the referee in Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v.
could have precipitated the heart attack, he was unable to state whether decedent was actually
under stress while working. Justice Pomeroy objected to this testimony because it constituted
"in essence, nothing more than speculation as to the requisite of a 'relationship' between em-
ployment and injury." Id at 299 n.2, 388 A.2d at 665 n.2. He demanded more certain, une-
quivocal testimony to establish the necessary causal link between decedent's injury and his
employment. Id.
64. The test for an obvious causal relationship was stated by the court in Giant Markets,
Inc. v. Morgan, 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. 439, 368 A.2d 885 (1977) as whether "the claimant's inju-
ries are so immediately and directly, or naturally and probably, the result of the work incident
that medical testimony on the question of causation was unnecessary." Id at 442, 368 A.2d at
886-87, See also Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 22 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 437, 349 A.2d 529 (1975); Munns v. Easthome Furniture Indus., Inc., 193 Pa.
Super. Ct. 61, 164 A.2d 30 (1960).
65. See Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Bowen, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 593, 364
A.2d 1387 (1976); Dunlap v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 19,
330 A.2d 555 (1975).
66. 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 441, 333 A.2d 233 (1975).
67. Id at 445, 333 A.2d at 236.
68. 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 19, 330 A.2d 555 (1975).
69. Id at 22, 330 A.2d at 556.
70. See Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Bowen, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 593, 364
A.2d 1387 (1976); Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Auto Express, Inc., 21 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 559, 346 A.2d 829 (1975); Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 562, 342 A.2d 766 (1975).
71. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Bowen, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 593, 598, 364
A.2d 1387, 1390 (1976). See also Westmoreland Cas. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Bd., 36 Pa. Commw. Ct. 307, 387 A.2d 683 (1978).
Bowen7 2 accepted as dispositive on the causation issue, testimony
that claimant's work activity possibly did bring on the heart attack
and that it is common for hard work similar to that in which claim-
ant was engaged to bring on heart attacks." Since the testimony was
not rebutted74 by decedent's employer, the referee's ruling, as af-
firmed by the appeal board, was supported by substantial evidence
and thus binding on reviewing courts."
Pennsylvania courts rendering decisions in heart attack cases af-
ter the 1972 amendments have therefore accepted an entire range of
medical testimony as sufficient to establish causation. 76 The testi-
mony accepted by the Pincus majority is among the weakest, most
equivocal testimony encountered in post-1972 heart cases in which
causation was found. This demonstrates that the spectrum of accept-
able testimony under the heart attack standard of less than unquali-
fied certainty is practically boundless, and therein lies the problem
with this so called standard. Its acceptance of a broad range of testi-
mony, encouraged by the provision that it need not be given with
unqualified certainty, reduces it to a non-standard.
Pennsylvania's workmen's compensation legislation is "a hu-
manitarian measure whose purpose is to provide relief to an em-
ployee from the economic consequences and burdens which result
from industrial accidents. 77 It must be given a liberal construc-
tion 78 to effect this purpose.79 By eliminating the accident require-
ment and adding the phrase "related thereto," the 1972 amendments
made all work-related injuries compensable, 0 and expanded the en-
tire base of compensability under the Act,8 ' thereby providing even
more relief to injured workers. The purpose of the legislation, how-
72. 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 593, 597, 364 A.2d 1387, 1389 (1976).
73. Id at 597, 364 A.2d at 1389.
74. The finder of fact, however, need not accept medical testimony even if it is uncontra-
dicted. Aluminum Co. of America v. Theis, I1 Pa. Commw. Ct. 587, 314 A.2d 893 (1974).
75. See notes 38 and 39 and accompanying text supra.
76. See, e.g., Stump v. Follmer Trucking Co., 448 Pa. 313, 292 A.2d 294 (1972) (medical
testimony relating to decedent's emotional excitement is competent to support a finding of
causation between a minor truck accident and a decedent's heart attack); R.F. Post, Inc. v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 32 Pa. Commw. Ct. 203, 378 A.2d 1030 (1977) (medi-
cal testimony concerning the climatic conditions in which a job is performed is competent to
establish causation between decedent truck driver's duties and his heart attack).
77. Comment, A Reappraisal of the "Unusual Exertion" Doctrine in the '"eart Cases"
Under Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Law, 46 TEMPLE L.Q. 126, 133 (1972).
78. Borderline interpretations under the Act are to be resolved in favor of the injured
employe. Hinkle v. H.J. Heinz Co., 462 Pa. 111, 337 A.2d 907 (1975); United States Steel
Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 247, 309 A.2d 842 (1973).
79. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. United States Steel Corp., 31 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 329, 376 A.2d 271 (1977).
80. Id at 333, 376 A.2d at 273.
81. Indeed, the commonwealth court advised that one cannot interpret the phrase "and
related thereto" added by the 1972 amendments as imposing any additional conditions to com-
pensability in cases that were compensable prior to the 1972 legislation. Rather, the new
phrase has crucial applicability only in cases that would not have been compensable prior to
1972. Id at 334, 376 A.2d at 274.
ever, is to compensate for injuries and not to convert the employer
into an insurer of the life and health of his employes.
82
The standard of proof adopted by the Pincus majority, typified
by the Bowen, case,83 which permits medical testimony concerning
causation to be given with less than qualified certainty, does not pro-
vide adequate protection against the potential conversion of work-
men's compensation coverage into general group life and health
insurance. As discussed earlier, this standard accepts an almost lim-
itless range of testimony as dispositive on the issue of causation. The
Columbus-Dunlap84 standard, on the other hand, typifies the more
unequivocal, certain standard called for by Justice Pomeroy in his
dissent in Pincus. This standard recognizes that causation has prop-
erly become the overriding inquiry of courts in workmen's compen-
sation cases under the 1972 amendments. It merely asks that
medical testimony on the causation issue be given with a degree of
certainty that will demonstrate that the injury was clearly related to
employment. The broadening of the entire base of compensability
that resulted from the 1972 amendments needs to be tempered by
this type of standard. It can readily be applied by referees, appeal
boards and courts to guard against spurious claims and to placate
fears that the Workmen's Compensation Act may degenerate into an
irrational legislative giveaway. 85 While the Pincus holding is signifi-
cant for its removal of the violence aspect from the injury require-
ment and its affirmation of compensation to heart attack victims with
pre-existing heart conditions, it fails to provide any direction to
referees and courts on the fundamental problem of causation.86 To
82. Rettew v. Graybill, 193 Pa. Super. Ct. 564, 568, 165 A.2d 424, 426 (1960); American
St. Gobain Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 11 Pa. Commw. Ct. 388, 392, 314
A.2d 40, 42 (1974). See also Quinn, Compensability of Stress Heart Attacks in Pennsylvania, 15
DUQ. L. REV. 37, 47 (1976).
83. See notes 72-75 and accompanying text supra.
84. See notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra
85. See Quinn, supra note 82, at 47.
86. The court dismissed appellants' arguments for a more compelling causal connection
between decedents' heart attacks and their employment by stating,
Since the enactment of the 1972 amendments to the Workmen's Compensation
Act, the Commonwealth Court has consistently held that where a decedent was per-
forming his or her usual job assigriment at the time of the fatal heart attack, and the
connection between the work and the heart attack was supported by competent medi-
cal testimony, decedents' claimant was entitled to compensation.
479 Pa. at 295, 388 A.2d at 663 (emphasis added). The court by its use of the word "sup-
ported" indicates that it will not require future claimants to substantiate fully or prove the
causal connection between their injury and employment. Therefore, almost any claimant can
produce competent medical testimony supporting causation. If the referee accepts that testi-
mony over that offered by the employer, and the board and courts subseqently agree, causation
is established. The requirment of "supporting" the causal relationship leaves the referees,
boards, and courts in a position of weighing the contrasting testimony. Merely weighing testi-
mony and finding causation on a majority of evidence belittles the fundamental position of
causation and gives no indication to claimants of the degree of causation they must establish to
gain compensation.
[Casenote by James P. Dykes)
that end, the task presented to courts reviewing future workmen's
compensation cases is to enunciate causation guidelines for applica-
tion by referees that permit compensation for every meritorious
claim, but at the same time preserve the integrity and spirit of the
workmen's compensation system.
[Casenote by James P. Dykes]

